欧洲议会如何更好地监督欧洲中央银行.docx

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1、CONTENTSLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS4LIST OF FIGURES5LIST OF TABLES5EXECUTIVE SUMMARY6INTRODUCTION81. HOW DOES THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT HOLD THE ECB TO ACCOUNT?91.1. ECB Mandate91.2. ECB Transparency101.3. The ECBs relationship with the EuropeanParliament11LESSONS FROM THE BANK OF JAPAN AND THE JAPANESE DIE

2、T141.4. Mandate of the BoJ141.5. BoJ Transparency151.6. Relationship of the BoJ with the Diet and the government16RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE ECB ACCOUNTABILITYBEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT201.7. Improvingthe monetary dialogue201.8. Pushingfor even moretransparency in decision making211.9. Rankingth

3、e ECBs secondary objectives22CONCLUSION2425REFERENCESThe Monetary Dialogue represents the primary channel for ECB accountability. However, whether these hearings provide effective oversight is debateable. MEPs questions are often unfocused, and many questions are not related to monetary policy or fi

4、nancial issues, but focus on other topics, often of national or even personal interest. There is little specific scrutiny of the ECBs recent track record in fulfilling its mandate. Perhaps as a result, these hearings receive little media attention, and their market effect is negligible (Fraccaroli e

5、t al., 2018). This is in contrast to other speeches or interviews given by the President ofthe ECB.Finally, the EP Rules of Procedure provide MEPs with another way to interact with the ECB by allowing them to submit written questions to the ECBRule 140 states that: Any Member may put a maximum of si

6、x questions for written answer per month to the European Central Bank . If a question for written answer has not received a reply within six weeks, it may, at the request of its author, be included on the agenda for the next meeting of the committee responsible with the President of the European Cen

7、tral Bank., a possibility that has been used quite extensively in recent years by MEPs (the number of letters sent per yearpeaked in 2015 at 152).While all these tools allow MEPs to monitor the ECBs activities and to question the ECB President and other members ofthe Executive Board, the EP does not

8、 have the power to sanction the ECB, or to initiate legislation to change the ECB framework, should MEPs considerthat the ECB is not fulfilling its mandate.Indeed, to amend fundamental aspects of the ECB/s mandate or its accountability framework would require the approval of all Member States. It is

9、 true that the European Parliament can participate in the amendment of certain sections of the ESCB/ECB statute Article 129 of the TFEU: Articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 17,18,19.1, 22, 23, 24, 26, 32.2, 32.3, 32.4, 32.6, 33.1(a) and 36 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB may be amended by the European

10、 Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. They shall act either on a recommendation from the European Central Bank and after consulting the Commission or on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Central Bank. However, there

11、are two caveats: first, the articles that can be modified mainly relate to less fundamental issues, and, second these amendments must be done under the Ells ordinary legislative procedure, meaning that the EP does not have the right of initiative, which belongs to the European Commission, and that t

12、he Council needs to agree with the EP.The appointment of decision-makers could provide another way for the EP to influence the policy adopted by the ECB in the future. But on that front, the role of the European Parliament is also very limited. The European Parliament only participates in the appoin

13、tment ofthe members ofthe ECBs Executive Board in an advisory capacity, as it can only provide a non-binding opinion, similarly to the current ECB Governing Council members Article 283 of the TFEU: fThe President, the Vice-President and the other members ofthe Executive Board shall be appointed by t

14、he European Council, acting by a qualified majority, from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council ofthe European Central Bank：, In p

15、ractice, the EP holds a hearing for prospective Executive Board candidates and has a vote. If this vote is negative, the EP can ask European Council for a new candidate, but the Council has no obligation to comply Rule 130 of the EP Rules of Procedure: L The candidate nominated as President, Vice-Pr

16、esident or Member of the Executive Board ofthe European Central Bank shall be invited to make a statement before the committee responsible and to answer questions put by its members. 2 The committee responsible shall make a recommendation to Parliament as to whether the nomination should be approved

17、 4, If the opinion adopted by Parliament on a nomination is unfavourable, the President shall ask for the withdrawal ofthe nomination and for the submission to Parliament of a new nomination. The EPs influence over the choice of ECB Executive Board members relies exclusively on peer pressure. These

18、appointments are a prerogative of the Council. This is not a problem per se, as the Council is also a legitimate institution representing European Member States and their citizens. However, it could be considered inconsistent to give the responsibility for oversight and the responsibility for appoin

19、tments to different institutions. That said, even if the Council is able to choose Executive Board members, its influence over their decisions of is also limited by the fact that board members, 8-year terms are not renewable. Given that reappointment is not possible, this meansthat once someonehas b

20、een appointed, they haveno strong incentive to please those with the power to appoint. This was again decided in order to provide a high degree of independence to the Executive Board members, but the price to pay for that independence is that there exists no mechanism to incentivise themto do their

21、jobs properly andfulfil their mandates after they have been appointed.Furthermore, the European Parliament does not have the ability to sanction central bankers for their actions, in particular for the failure to fulfil their mandate. The ESCB/ECB statute contemplates the possibility of the EU Court

22、 of Justice retiring a member of the ECBs Executive Board. However, this process cannot be initiated by the EP but only by the ECB itself, and it would require either a serious allegation of misconduct or a medical reason making it impossible for a board member to perform his or her duties 6 Therefo

23、re, it is highly unlikely that this could be used as a credible threat to incentivise Executive Board membersto fulfil their mandatesmore diligently.Finally, it is also interesting to note that even though the ECB is accountable to the EP, the possibility for other institutions (for membersof the Eu

24、ropean Commission or the president of the Council) to be present duringthe ECB/sGoverning Council meetings is not offered to MEPsArticle 11 of the Statute stipulates: f/lf a member of the Executive Board no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been gu

25、ilty of serious misconduct, the Court of Justice may, on application by the Governing Council or the Executive Board, compulsorily retire him.Article 284 of the TFEU states that: /zl. The President of the Council and a Member of the Commission may participate, without having the right to vote, in me

26、etings of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. The President of the Council may submit a motion for deliberation to the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. 2. The President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to participate in Council meetings when the Council is

27、 discussing matters relating to the objectives and tasks of the ESCB.Overall, the power of the European Parliamentto discipline the ECB is very limited. There is rather little the EP can do to incentivise the ECB to fulfil its mandate beyond monitoring its activities and asking questions to the ECB

28、President in the Monetary Dialogue. That is why it is crucial that this occasion is well used to increase the European Parliament pressure onthe ECB to do its job well. We will come back to this in our final section.3. LESSONS FROM THE BANK OF JAPAN ANDTHE JAPANESEDIETIn Claeys et al. (2014) we disc

29、ussed the Feds and the BoEs accountability frameworks and compared them with the ECB. In this paper, we complete our study of the accountability of major central banks around the world by discussing how the Bank of Japan (BoJ) is accountable to the Japanese National Diet - i.e. the bicameral legisla

30、ture of Japan consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. The BoJ is interesting because its functioning is very different to its counterparts in Europe and North America.The Bank of Japan was created in 1882, following the Meiji restoration and shortly after the establi

31、shment of the yen as the new decimal national currency, but its current functioning was primarily determined by the 1997 Bank of Japan Act. The Act represented a move towards greater independence - to increase the credibility of the central bank both domestically and in the eyes of international cap

32、ital markets (Dwyer, 2004) - and towards more transparency - to ensure the accountability of the central bank in the light of its greater autonomyArticle 3(1) of the BoJ Act stipulates that: ,fThe Bank of Japans autonomy regarding currency and monetary control shall be respected”, while Article 3(2)

33、 adds that: The Bank of Japan shall endeavor to clarify to the citizen the content of its decisions, as well as its decision-making process, regarding currency and monetary control. The BoJ Act also set the Beds main objectives and the functioning of its decision-making body, a Policy Board of nine

34、members, including the Governor and two Deputy Governors.In this section, we assess howthe BoJ is held to account,based onthethree criteria highlighted before: 1) clarity of its mandate and objectives enshrined in law; 2) transparency of decision-making and implementation of monetary policy; and 3)

35、degree of responsibility held by the political body holding the central bank accountable (in appointments, monitoring, possibility to change the law or to sanction the central bank, etc.).3.1. Mandate of the BoJAs explained before, enshrining specific and clear objectives into law is essential to en

36、sure the accountability of the central bank, as it provides a benchmark that aids political bodies in monitoring and assessing the central banks performance. This is done in Article 1 of the BoJ act: (1) The purpose of the Bank of Japan, orthe Central Bank of Japan, is to issue banknotes and to carr

37、yout currency and monetary control. (2) In addition to what is prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the Bankof Japans purpose is to ensure smooth settlement of funds among banks andother financial institutions, thereby contributing tothe maintenance of stability of thefinancial system”, while Arti

38、cle 2 adds that Currency and monetary control by the Bank of Japan shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sou nd development of the national economy.In theory, this means that the BoJ has a double mandate: it is responsible for ensuing both financial and price stabi

39、lity. However, there is neither a clear ranking between the two main objectives nor a numerical target for price stability in the BoJ Act. This meansthat in practice the BoJ should determine its own quantitative definition of price stability and would need to rank its objectives if a trade-off betwe

40、en the two were to arise.As far as price stability is concerned, the Bank of Japan has established its own quantifiable target which has evolved over the years. Between 2006 and 2012 the BoJ had an implicit target of 1 percent, which was the level considered by Policy Board members as consistent wit

41、h price stability in the medium to longterm. In February 2012, the BoJ announced an official inflation target within a positive range of 2percent or lower while setting the goal at 1 percent for the time being (BoJ, 2012). However, less than a year later, in January 2013, it introduced a new price s

42、tability target ”at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (BoJ, 2013b), We see this as a positive development not only because a clearer target should act (at least in theory) as a better focal point to anchor inflation expectations (Blinder et al., 2008)

43、but also in terms of accountability. While the new target is not enshrined in law and has not been determined directly by an elected assembly, the 2 percent target finally provides a precise and understandable quantitative benchmark against which the Diet can judgethe BoJ/s performance.The fact that

44、 the adoption of the newtarget coincided with the election of prime minister Shinzo Abe in December 2012 - who publicly called for such a change before the election - did not escape observers (e.g. Neely, 2013), who interpreted this as a sign of political influence over the BoJs decision. Another st

45、rong indication that this change might have resulted from the political pressure from the new government is that this move was executed in parallel to the issuance of a joint statement between the BoJ and the government in which the BoJ pledged to “pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this targ

46、et at the earliest possible time (BoJ, 2013a). This seems to indicate, at least on that occasion, some form of political involvement in setting the BoJ target Pressuring the BoJ to adopt a higher and more precise target might have been justified, given the BoJs underperformance leading to two decade

47、s of mild deflation from the BoJ Act of 1997 to Abes election at the end of 2012 (Figure 1). However, the newtarget was hardly the result of a transparent review of the BoJ target by the Diet, but of indirect pressure from the new government, and was done in a rather opaque manner.year change in %56

48、OTZm 寸 LQ9N006OTZm 寸 S9N86。 6OOOOOOOOOOTmmmz cnooooooooooooooooooooo TZZZZZZZZZZfNZZZZZZZZZZFigure 1:Headline and core inflation in the euro area (LHS) and in Japan (RHS), year on6OTZcn 寸 LD9N86OTZm 寸 LD9N86 O6。O TZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ zSource: Bruegel based on Eurostat and Statistics of Japan. Notes

49、: Euro area core inflation excludes energy, food, alcohol and tobacco; Japanese core inflation excludesfresh foods and energy.3.2. BoJ TransparencyThe need for transparency is enshrined in the Bank of Japan Act16, In practice, in Japan this entails that the BoJ Policy Board releasesits monetary policy decisions, the detailed guidelines for its open market operations and, more generally, its views on economic and financial developments.