DG德国的俄罗斯战略可能会发生什 么变化.docx

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1、DGAPGERMANYS RUSSIA POLICY DILEMMAAfter the attempted poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and continued Kremlin support for Alexander Lukashenko despite massive fraud in Belaruss presidential election, a change in the EUs approach to Russia is urgently needed. Even before this, Ger

2、man-Russian relations had slumped to a new low, after German security agencies confirmed the Russian secret service was behind the attempted hacking of Germanys parliament in 2015/ and a Georgian national was assassinated in Berlin in August 2019, likely on Russian governement orders. Tagesschau, HH

3、aftbefehl gegen Hacker Arrest Orders for Hackers, (last accessed May 5, 2020).After the attempted poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and continued Kremlin support for Alexander Lukashenko despite massive fraud in Belaruss presidential election, a change in the EUs approach to Russ

4、ia is urgently needed. Even before this, German-Russian relations had slumped to a new low, after German security agencies confirmed the Russian secret service was behind the attempted hacking of Germanys parliament in 2015/ and a Georgian national was assassinated in Berlin in August 2019, likely o

5、n Russian governement orders. Tagesschau, HHaftbefehl gegen Hacker Arrest Orders for Hackers, (last accessed May 5, 2020). Bellincat, 44Suspected Accomplice in Berlin Tiergarten Murder Identified as FSB/Vympel Officer, europe/2020/08/29/suspected-accomplice-in-berlin-tiergarten-murder-identified- as

6、-fsb-vympel-officer/ (last accessed August 28, 2020). As well as speculating that the attack on Navalny was carried out by opponents of Nord Stream 2, Gregor Gysi, spokesperson on foreign affairs for Die Linke The Left Party, has rejected sanctions on Russia. His argument, in opposition to critics o

7、f the Kremlin, unquestionably has one eye on the upcoming 2021 federal elections. MDR.de, uGysi kritisiert Drohungen mit Sanktionen gegen Russland Gysi Criticizes Threats of Sanctions on Russia, . mdr.de/nachrichten/politik/ausland/gysi-vorverurteilung-russland-nawalny-100.html (last accessed Septem

8、ber 4, 2020). Another key factor has been Russias increased repression of opposition activists, journalists, artists and civil society figures, in the framework of an referendum in July 2020 which could enable President Vladimir Putin to serve two further terms after his current presidency ends in 2

9、024.The latest events coincide with Germanys presidency of the EU Council, as well as one of the most fraught periods for the EU since its foundation. On the horizon are German federal elections in fall of 2021, where Russia and its growing influence are sure to be issues? The German governmenfs pre

10、parations for the EU presidency had primarily focused on managing the economic fallout of the covid pandemic, and signing off on a new EU budget. On foreign policy, key themes for the EU are future relations with the UK, the United States, and China. In a May 2020 policy keynote speech made in the r

11、un-up to Germanys EU presidency, Angela Merkel placed Russia fourth in her list of pressing foreign policy concerns. Speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel at the AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der deutschen EU- RatsprQsidentscha代”Foreign and Security Policy During Germanys EU Presidency conference, K

12、onrad Adenauer Foundation, May 27, 2020, rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-im-rahmen-der-veranstaltung-aussen-und- sicherheitspolitik-in-der-deutschen-eu-ratspraesidentschaft-der-konrad- adenauer-stiftung-am-27-mai-2020-1755884 (last accessed September 5, 2020). Relations with Russia seemed to have mo

13、ved to the back burner. But the Russian question remains as urgent as any other for EU member states. This presents Berlin with a dilemma: how to manage future relations with Russia when Moscow shows no interest in cooperating with Germany and the EU, but continues to play a vital role in key intern

14、ational conflicts (Syria, Libya, Iran) and in the Eastern neighborhood of the EU (Ukraine, Belarus)?To understand its urgency, the Russian question must be seen against the backdrop of shifting US foreign policy objectives. Washington has cast doubt on security guarantees for Europe, it pursues its

15、own, contradictory policy toward Russia without consulting its European partners, and it can no longer guarantee stability in the Middle East. The United States and the EU are at cross purposes with regard to the countries of the EUs Eastern Partnership and the worsening situation in the Balkans. Ru

16、ssia is involved in all of these questions, but as a destructive force. Globally, US-Chinese conflict is escalating. At the same time, relations between Moscow and Beijing have seen a rapprochement, after the conflict in Ukraine led to a deterioration in Russias relations with the EU and NATO.SELECT

17、IVE ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIA, BUT WITH NO COMMON BASISIn November 2018, German foreign minister Heiko Maas announced a New European Ostpolitik. However, the weakness of the New Eastern Policy concept left its basic aims unclear to its main addressees, the countries of East-Central Europe. Since then,

18、Berlin has avoided official use of the term. German Foreign Ministry, BegruBungsrede von AuBenminister Heiko Mass anlasslich des Berliner Forums AuBenpolitik Opening Remarks by Foreign Minister Heiko Mass at the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum, November 27, 2018, s:/ auswaertiges- amt.de/de/newsroom/maa

19、s-berliner-forum- aussenpolitik/2164430 (last accessed September 5, 2020).In November 2018, German foreign minister Heiko Maas announced a New European Ostpolitik. However, the weakness of the New Eastern Policy concept left its basic aims unclear to its main addressees, the countries of East-Centra

20、l Europe. Since then, Berlin has avoided official use of the term. German Foreign Ministry, BegruBungsrede von AuBenminister Heiko Mass anlasslich des Berliner Forums AuBenpolitik Opening Remarks by Foreign Minister Heiko Mass at the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum, November 27, 2018, s:/ auswaertiges-

21、amt.de/de/newsroom/maas-berliner-forum- aussenpolitik/2164430 (last accessed September 5, 2020). This means selective engagment in areas of common interest -Syria, Libya, Iran, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline - now forms the core of Germanys approach to Russia. As a term, selective engagement first appea

22、red in 2016, announced as part of the EUs five basic principles for relations with Russia after the conflict in Ukraine. All citations from: European Parliament, The EUs Russia Policy: Five Guiding Principles, February 2018, etudes/BRIE/2018/614698/EPRS_BRI(2018)614698_EN.pdf. Those principles recog

23、nized Russia as an important player in the Middle East, with a constructive role in the nuclear agreement with Iran. TheDGAPDGAPphrase also refers to common interests in fighting international terrorism in Syria, although Moscow does not share the EUs desire for the democratization of that country.

24、In addition, Russia is protecting the Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad. The EU and UN see Assad as a war criminal, guilty of crimes against his own people; Moscow also sees itself as under threat from war crimes accusations. UN News, Those responsible for war crimes in Syria will be held accountable fo

25、r what they have done, says UN rights chief, March 2, 2018 . un.org/en/story/2018/03/1 003981 (last accessed September 5, 2020).The most concrete suggestion made by the EU position paper was to invest in civil society organizations and relationships in countries to its east. However, civil society f

26、igures have been the main target of the Russian leadership, which has attempted to cut them 。仔 from international contacts and money, seeking to stop external influence on domestic Russian affairs.After worsening of the German-Russian relations in the context of the Ukraine conflict, since autumn 20

27、19 Chancellor Merkel attempted a more pragmatic policy toward Moscow. This approach underlay Berlins reaction to Assads military victories in Syria, the escalation of the Libyan situation, President Trumps systematic undermining of the Iran nuclear deal, and Washingtons imposition of incremental san

28、ctions on those involved in the Nord Stream 2 project. This meant difficult themes - disinformation, hacker attacks, and continuing conflict in the Donbass region - attracted comparatively less attention. Talks with the Russian president tended to focus on Nord Stream 2, Iran, Syria, and Libya. At a

29、 January 2020 meeting with Putin, Merkel emphasized the two countries, points in common, rather than their differences. Deutsche Welle, Merkel und Putin suchen gemeinsame Linie Merkel and Putin Seek a Common Line January 11,2020, und-putin-suchen-gemeinsame-linie/a-51953705 (last accessed September

30、5, 2020).Even with these themes - supposedly representing common interests - the devil was in the detail. Moscow sees itself as a winner in the Syrian civil war, and expects the EU and Germany to offer financial support to Assad so as to prevent another wave of refugees arriving in Europe. But this

31、flies in the face of Berlins refusal to recognize Assad as the legitimate ruler of Syria and its insistence that reconstruction must form part of an overall democratic transition for Syria. In Libya, Moscow continues to send arms and mercenaries to ex-general Khalifa Haftar, a key figure in the figh

32、t against the internationally-recognized government. By contrast, Germany has attempted to arrange talks between all warring parties, looking to negotiate a durable ceasefire and end the flow of weapons and foreign fighters into the country. But with Berlin not prepared to impose its demands militar

33、ily in the context of NATO or EU - and anyway incapable of doing so - Moscow does notNord Stream 2should be underintense scrutiny.view it as a decisive actor in the conflict. At the same time, both Moscow and Berlin are too weak to stand up to President Trump and save the Iran nuclear deal. This mea

34、ns that in reality, selective cooperation with Russia has been limited to declarations of intent. This tends, in fact, to highlight points of conflict rather than points in common.Nonetheless, Berlin has continued to support Nord Stream 2, even after Russias annexation of the Crimea in 2014. It does

35、 so for domestic political considerations, economic factors, and also as a possible area of cooperation with Russia, a field of selective engagement. Stefan Meister, Nord Stream 2: The Dead End of Germanys Ostpolitik, Berlin Policy Journal, February 20, 2019, s:/dgap.org/en/research/ publications/no

36、rd-stream-2-dead-end-germanys-ostpolitik (last accessed September 5, 2020). For a long time, Berlin ignored the Kremlins view of the project, which it sees as a way for Russia to intensify its influence within Germany and other EU member states, divide the EU, expand Putins self-enrichment operation

37、s, all while directly weakening Ukraine in economic terms. The United States has responded to the pipeline project with extraterritorial sanctions. This undermining of Germanys and EUs autonomous economic policy is unacceptable to Berlin. Sascha Lohmann and Kirsten Westphal, Unilaterale US-Sanktione

38、n gegen Petrostaaten: Die Geopolitisierung des internationalen Olmarktes Unilateral US Sanctions on Retro-States: The Geopoliticization of the International Oil Market, SWP-Studie 28, December 2019, fileadmin/bontents/products/studien/2019S28_lom_wep.pdf (last accessed September 5, 2020). However, t

39、he damage done by Nord Stream 2 both to internal EU relations and to trans-Atlantic relations was underestimated. It is certainly possible for the selective engagement ap-DGAPproach to simultaneously include sanctions, on the one hand, and fostering economic and energy relations, on the other. Howev

40、er it has become clear that Moscow is unprepared to make compromises on Ukraine and other international issues, despite German support for Nord Stream 2.MACRONS “NEW” RUSSIA POLICYOn a European level, a separate initative has been launched by the French president Emmanuel Macron, looking to make a f

41、resh start in Russian relations, based on common interests and pragmatic politics. Macrons plan aims to end Russias isolation and alienation. Ambassadors Conference Speech by Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, August 27, 2019, conference-Speech-by-M-Emmanuel-Macron-President-of-the-Republic

42、 (last accessed September 5, 2020).On a European level, a separate initative has been launched by the French president Emmanuel Macron, looking to make a fresh start in Russian relations, based on common interests and pragmatic politics. Macrons plan aims to end Russias isolation and alienation. Amb

43、assadors Conference Speech by Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, August 27, 2019, conference-Speech-by-M-Emmanuel-Macron-President-of-the-Republic (last accessed September 5, 2020). The French president believes that Europe can have no security without Russia, which is also a mantra in Germ

44、anys own Russia policy. The French strategy has been prompted by Russian-Chinese rapprochement, the American withdrawal from Europe, and by the need to work out new European security structures more attentive to Russian in-Fostering changethrough rapprochementhas failed.terests. Establishing better

45、relations with Moscow on the basis of common interests - while disregarding the security concerns of neighboring states - sounds quite like the traditional German approach, up to and including Nord Stream 2. However, Macrons strategy was not agreed with Germany or with other EU states, to the irrita

46、tion of many European governments, including Berlin. For Macron, Russia is not only a partner in European security, but also in issues of technological sovereignty, with key areas of cooperation including aerospace and cybersecurity, above all with regard to China and the United States.An initial me

47、eting between Macron and Putin before the G7 summit in August 2019 has led, one year later, to the establishment of thirteen bilateral working groups, addressing questions including cybersecurity, aerospace, arms control, and international conflicts. This model has already been used in German-Russia

48、n relations in the past. However, the policy ultimately leads down a dead end, given Frances weak negotiating position vis-a-vis Russia. For Moscow, the attraction of the Macron initiative is to create divisions within the EU, and above all, in Europes trans-Atlantic relations. In his by-now famous

49、2019 speech to the assembled ambassadors to France, Macron emphasized the Russian argument that European powers are the Wests Trojan horse/ lacking their own approaches to Russia. This line of argument does more to strengthen Russian propaganda narratives than to develop a new EU Russia policy. See note 11. As long as Berlin and