最新微观经济学12章PPT课件.ppt

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1、微观经济学微观经济学1212章章chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezOligopoly and Strategic Behavior oligopolyA market served by a few firms.game theoryThe study of decision making instrategic situations.2chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Econom

2、ics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin Perezchapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin Perezchapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin Perezchapter 2007 Pearson/Pr

3、entice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin Perezchapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin Perezchapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin Perezchapt

4、er 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezCARTEL PRICING AND THEDUOPOLISTS DILEMMA12.2Price-Fixing and the Game Tree9chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezCARTEL PRICING AND

5、 THEDUOPOLISTS DILEMMA12.2Equilibrium of the Price-Fixing Game dominant strategyAn action that is the best choice for aplayer,no matter what the otherplayer does.duopolists dilemmaA situation in which both firms in amarket would be better off if bothchose the high price,but eachchooses the low price

6、.10chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezCARTEL PRICING AND THEDUOPOLISTS DILEMMA12.2Nash Equilibrium Nash equilibriumAn outcome of a game in which eachplayer is doing the best he or she can,given the action of the other players.11c

7、hapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezOVERCOMING THE DUOPOLISTSDILEMMA12.3Low-Price Guarantees low-price guaranteeA promise to match a lower price of a competitor.FIGURE 12.4Low-Price Guarantees Increase Prices12chapter 2007 Pearson/

8、Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezVITAMIN INC.GETS BUSTEDAPPLYING THE CONCEPTS#1:How do firms conspire to fix prices?In April 2000,four former executives of drug companies pled guilty to conspiring to fix the prices of bulk vitamins worldwide.It was

9、 the largest price-fixing case in U.S.history.The announcement brought the number of Swiss and German executives imprisoned for the case to six,with fines for the individual executives and their companies totaling$1 billion.For almost a decade,these executives conspired to stifle competition around

10、the globe by fixing prices on vitamins A,B2,B5,C,E,and beta carotene.The executives called their group“Vitamin Inc.”and met regularly in hotel rooms to carve up the market.The cartel managed to boost the prices of vitamins,with markups averaging about 20 percent,or even more at the high-end of the v

11、itamin price range.13chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezLOW-PRICE GUARANTEES AND EMPTY PROMISESAPPLYING THE CONCEPTS#2:Does a low-price guarantee lead to higher or lower prices?Will a low-price guarantee lead to lower prices?A lo

12、w-price guarantee eliminates the possibility that one firm will underprice the other and,thus leads to high prices.If firm A promises to give refunds if its price exceeds firm Bs price,we might expect firm A to keep its price low to avoid handing out a lot of refunds.Firm A doesnt have to worry abou

13、t giving refunds because firm B will also choose the high price.In other words,the promise to issue refunds is an empty promise.Although consumers might think that a low-price guarantee will protect them from high prices,it means that consumers are more likely to pay the high price.14chapter 2007 Pe

14、arson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezOVERCOMING THE DUOPOLISTSDILEMMA12.3Repeated Pricing Games with Retaliation for Underpricing grim-trigger strategyA strategy where a firm responds to underpricing by choosing a price so low that each firm make

15、s zero economic profit.Firms use several strategies to maintain a price-fixing agreement.One of the following strategies can be used to punish a firm that underprices:1 A duopoly pricing strategy.2 A grim-trigger strategy.3 A tit-for-tat strategy.tit-for-tatA strategy where one firm chooses whatever

16、 price the other firm chose in the preceding period.15chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezOVERCOMING THE DUOPOLISTSDILEMMA12.3Repeated Pricing Games with Retaliation for Underpricing FIGURE 12.5A Tit-for-Tat Pricing Strategy16chap

17、ter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezOVERCOMING THE DUOPOLISTSDILEMMA12.3Price-Fixing and the LawUnder the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and subsequent legislation,explicit price-fixing is illegal.It is illegal for firms to discuss pri

18、cing strategies or methods of punishing a firm that underprices other firms.17chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezALTERNATIVE MODELS OFOLIGOPOLY PRICING12.4Price Leadership price leadershipA system under which one firm in anoligop

19、oly takes the lead in settingprices.The problem with an implicit pricing agreement is that it relies on indirect signals that are often garbled and misinterpreted.When one firm suddenly drops its price,the other firm could interpret the price cut in one of two ways:A change in market conditions.Unde

20、rpricing.18chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezALTERNATIVE MODELS OFOLIGOPOLY PRICING12.4The Kinked Demand Curve Model kinked demand curve modelA model in which firms in anoligopoly match price cuts by otherfirms,but do not match

21、price hikes.19chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezALTERNATIVE MODELS OFOLIGOPOLY PRICING12.4The Kinked Demand Curve Model FIGURE 12.6Kinked Demand Curve Model20chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,a

22、nd Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezSIMULTANEOUS DECISION MAKINGAND THE PAYOFF MATRIX12.5 payoff matrixA matrix or table that shows,for eachpossible outcome of a game,theconsequences for each player.21chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffri

23、n PerezSIMULTANEOUS DECISION MAKINGAND THE PAYOFF MATRIX12.5Simultaneous Price-Fixing Game FIGURE 12.7Payoff Matrix for the Price-Fixing Game22chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezSIMULTANEOUS DECISION MAKINGAND THE PAYOFF MATRIX12

24、.5The Prisoners Dilemma FIGURE 12.8Payoff Matrix for the Prisoners Dilemma23chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezTHE INSECURE MONOPOLIST ANDENTRY DETERRENCE12.6The Passive Approach FIGURE 12.9Deterring Entry with Limit Pricing24cha

25、pter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezPUTTING DETROIT IN THE SHOPNew car buyers want new fuel efficient makes and models that perform well and look good.Critics maintain that Detroit automakers were resting easy on SUV profits and payi

26、ng little attention to the competition.While domestic producers only remake an auto design every seven or eight years,Toyota overhauls its lineup every five years.U.S.designers are also hard at work addressing quality issues and trying to incorporate fuel efficiency.Domestic automakers were isolated

27、 from most imports until the last 20 to 30 years.However,now foreign manufacturers have greater access to the U.S.market and are placing new competitive pressures on GM,Ford,and Chrysler.Even though this market is oligopolistic we are beginning to see behavior that is more competitive.Detroits big t

28、hree automakers lost a combined$7.4 billion for the most recent quarter ending September 30.In the meantime,competitor Toyota continues to gain ground and will soon be the worlds number one automaker.Newly won Toyota customers cite styling issues and reliability concerns as their primary reason for

29、switching to imports.Extra Application 625chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezTHE INSECURE MONOPOLIST ANDENTRY DETERRENCE12.6Entry Deterrence and Limit PricingThe quantity required to prevent the entry of the second firm is comput

30、ed as follows:deterring quantity=zero profit quantity minimum entry quantity26chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezTHE INSECURE MONOPOLIST ANDENTRY DETERRENCE12.6Entry Deterrence and Limit Pricing FIGURE 12.10Game Tree for the Entr

31、y-Deterrence Game limit pricingThe strategy of reducing the price to deter entry.27chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezLEGAL AND ILLEGAL ENTRY DETERRENCEAPPLYING THE CONCEPTS#3:What meanslegal and illegaldo firms use to prevent ot

32、her firms from entering a market?When firms use limit pricing to prevent other firms from entering the market,entry deterrence is legal.The European Commission has uncovered many examples of entry deterrence that are illegal under the rules of the European Union.Van den Bergh Foods,a subsidiary of U

33、nilever,provided“free”freezer cabinets to retailers,under the condition that the cabinets were to be used exclusively for the storage of Unilevers ice cream products.The Commission concluded that this practice constituted an abuse of Unilevers dominant position.In 2003,the European Court of First In

34、stance ordered Unilever to share the freezer cabinets with its competitors,including the Mars Company,which had argued that it was unable to sell its ice cream in retail outlets.28chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezTHE INSECURE M

35、ONOPOLIST ANDENTRY DETERRENCE12.6Examples:Microsoft Windows and Campus BookstoresEntry Deterrence and Contestable Markets contestable marketA market with low entry and exitcosts.When Is the Passive Approach Better?Entry deterrence is not the best strategy for all insecure monopolists.Sharing a duopo

36、ly can be more profitable than increasing output and cutting the price to keep the other firm out.29chapter 2007 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezTHE ADVERTISERS DILEMMA12.7 FIGURE 12.11Game Tree for the Advertisers Dilemma30chapter 2007 Pe

37、arson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezREYNOLDS INTERNATIONAL TAKES THE MONEY ANDLEAVES THE MARKETAPPLYING THE CONCEPTS#4:When is it sensible for a monopolist not to take measures to prevent other firms from entering the market?In 1945,Reynolds Int

38、ernational Pen Corporation introduced a revolutionary product:the ballpoint pen.The new type of pen could be produced with a very simple production technology.For three years,Reynolds earned enormous profits on this innovative product.In 1948,Reynolds stopped producing pens,dropping out of the marke

39、t entirely.What happened?The key to solving this puzzle is the fact that Reynolds earned enormous profits for a short time.The simple technology of the ballpoint pen could be copied easily.The limit price was so low that it was better for Reynolds to charge a high price and squeeze out as much profi

40、t as possible from a short-lived monopoly.Reynolds sold its pens for$12.50,about 16 times the average production cost of$0.80.By 1948,a total of 100 firms had entered the ballpoint market,and the price had fallen to the average cost of production,so each firm made zero economic profit.31chapter 2007

41、 Pearson/Prentice Hall Economics:Principles,Applications,and Tools,5e OSullivan Sheffrin PerezCartel 卡特卡特尔concentration ratio 集中度集中度contestable market 可可竞争市争市场dominant strategy 主主导策略策略duopolists dilemma 双寡双寡头困境困境Duopoly 双寡双寡头垄断断game theory 博奕论博奕论game tree 决策树决策树grim-trigger strategy 玉石俱梵策玉石俱梵策略略 low-price guarantee 低价承诺低价承诺kinked demand curve model 折折拐的需求曲线拐的需求曲线limit pricing 限制定价限制定价Nash equilibrium 纳什均衡纳什均衡Oligopoly 寡头垄断寡头垄断payoff matrix 收益组合收益组合price-fixing 价格操纵价格操纵price leadership 价格领导价格领导tit-for-tat 以牙还牙策略以牙还牙策略32