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3、gExplore the RAND National Security Research DivisionView document detailsFor More InformationThis PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation.6Jump down to documentTHE ARTSCHILD POLICYCIVIL JUSTICEEDUCATIONENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTHEALTH AND HEALTH CAR

4、EINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSNATIONAL SECURITYPOPULATION AND AGINGPUBLIC SAFETYSCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGYSUBSTANCE ABUSETERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITYTRANSPORTATION ANDINFRASTRUCTUREWORKFORCE AND WORKPLACEThe RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solu

5、tions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.Purchase this documentBrowse Books&PublicationsMake a charitable contributionSupport RANDThis product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series.RAND monographs present major research findings that address

6、 the challenges facing the public and private sectors.All RAND mono-graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.David A.Shlapak,David T.Orletsky,Toy I.Reid,Murray Scot Tanner,Barry WilsonPrepared for the Smith Richardson FoundationNATIONAL SECURI

7、TY RESEARCH DIVISIONA Question of BalancePolitical Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan DisputeThe RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world

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11、e:(310)451-7002;Fax:(310)451-6915;Email:orderrand.orgThe research described in this report was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation and was conducted under the auspices of the International Security and Defense Policy Center within the RAND National Security Research Division(NSRD).NSRD cond

12、ucts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense,the Joint Staff,the Unified Commands,the defense agencies,the Department of the Navy,the Marine Corps,the U.S.Coast Guard,the U.S.Intelligence Community,allied foreign governments,and foundations.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-

13、Publication DataA question of balance:political context and military aspects of the China-Taiwan dispute/David A.Shlapak.et al.p.cm.Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 978-0-8330-4746-5(pbk.:alk.paper)1.TaiwanMilitary policy.2.ChinaMilitary policy.3.TaiwanMilitary relationsChina.4.ChinaMilitary

14、 relationsTaiwan.I.Shlapak,David A.II.Rand Corporation.National Security Research Division.UA853.T28A2 2009 355.033051249dc222009022233iiiPrefaceThis paper is the final report of a project titled“The Changing China-Taiwan Military Balance,”which evaluated key aspects of the China-Taiwan military bal

15、ance looking out toward 2015.The study addressed four key questions:How are the political dynamics of the cross-strait relationship changing,and how could those changes affect perceptions of the military balance?How effective might Chinas growing force of short-range ballistic missiles be in attacki

16、ng key military targets on Taiwan,such as air bases?How have changes in Chinese military capabilities changed the likely outcome of a possible contest for air superiority over the strait and Taiwan itself?In the light of the above,how can Taiwan be successfully defended against a Chinese invasion at

17、tempt?This report should be of interest to military,government,and civilian planners,analysts,and scholars working on issues relating to the Taiwan Strait situation,Chinese military modernization,and U.S.military force planning and strategy in the Western Pacific.This research was sponsored by the S

18、mith Richardson Foundation and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division(NSRD).NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense,the Joint Staff,the Unified Combatant Commands,the iv A Question o

19、f Balancedefense agencies,the Department of the Navy,the Marine Corps,the U.S.Coast Guard,the U.S.Intelligence Community,allied foreign governments,and foundations.For more information on RANDs International Security and Defense Policy Center,contact the Director,James Dobbins.He can be reached by e

20、mail at James_Dobbinsrand.org;by phone at 703-413-1100,extension 5134;or by mail at RAND,1200 South Hayes Street,Arlington,Virginia 22202-5050.More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org.vContentsPreface.iiiFigures.ixTables.xiSummary.xiiiAcknowledgments.xxiAbbreviations.xxiiiChAPTeR One

21、Introduction.1A Caveat.3ChAPTeR TwOChanging Cross-Strait Political Dynamics.5Beijings Attitude Toward the Status Quo:Will Patience Remain a Virtue?.6The Effects of Cross-Strait Economic Integration.8Mainland Sanctions Against Imports from Taiwan .10Disruption,Damage,or Sabotage of Financial Markets

22、or Information Networks.11Selective Harassment or Intimidation of Taiwanese Businesspeople .12Taiwans Evolving National Identity.14The Legacy of Chen Shui-bian.16The Politics of the Shifting Cross-Strait Military Balance.22Security Implications of the Changing Political Landscape.26The Dangers of Di

23、sappointment.28vi A Question of BalanceChAPTeR ThReeMissiles over the Strait:Chinas Short-Range Ballistic Missile Force.31Chinas Short-Range Ballistic Missile Force.32A Simplifying Assumption.34Air Base Attack.35Cutting Runways.37Hangars/Maintenance Facilities.44Attacking Aircraft Parked in the Open

24、.45Air Base Attack Observations.50Concluding Observations.51ChAPTeR FOuRAssessing the Air war.53Analytic Approach and Scenario Variables.56Chinese Aircrew Quality.58Chinese Air Operations.58Defenses Against Chinese PGMs.59Blue Sortie Generation.60ROC SAM Survivability.60Shelters at Blue Bases.61U.S.

25、Forces Engaged.62Laying Out the Scenario Space.63Character of the Air War.63The Base Case Battle.64Measures of Merit.67Overall Outcomes and Driving Factors.69Chinese Air Force Modernization.72Chinese Aircrew Quality.72Chinese Air Operations.74Defenses Against Precision-Guided Munitions .74Taiwanese

26、Air Force Modernization.75Blue Sortie Generation.76ROC SAM Survivability.79Number of Shelters.80U.S.Contributions.81Contents viiConcluding Remarks:Not Your Fathers Air War.84Sidebar:Would China Attack Japan?.86ChAPTeR FIveThe ultimate Roll of the Dice:A Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.91The Last Campaign

27、 of the Civil War:PLA Amphibious Operations,19491955.94The Falklands Campaign:Amphibious Warfare in the Age of the Antiship Missile.96Looking Forward:The Lessons of“Operation Corporate”.100Assessing the Odds:Could the Chinese Invade Taiwan?.103Adding It Up:The Invasion Threat to Taiwan.118ChAPTeR SI

28、xImplications,Conclusions,and Considerations.123The Political Backdrop.124The Fall of Shot:Of Warheads,Wreckage,and Will.125Unfriendly Skies:New Concepts Needed for New Challenges.129On the Beach:Defeating a Chinese Invasion .135Broadening the Scope:Implications for Other Scenario Variants.137The Ty

29、ranny of Distance and the Longer Term .139A Question of Balance:Maintaining Equilibrium on the Strait.141APPenDIxMissile Attacks on economic Targets on Taiwan.145Bibliography.151ixFigures 3.1.CSS-7(DF-11A)and CSS-6(DF-15B)SRBMs.33 3.2.Tainan Air Base on Taiwan.36 3.3.Runway Attack Schematic.38 3.4.P

30、robability of a Single Runway Cut,Given Number of Missiles and CEP .41 3.5.Probability of Cutting All Runways,Given Salvo Size and CEP.43 3.6.Large Hangar-Size Buildings on Tainan Air Base.44 3.7.Missiles Required to Hit 150 x 100 ft Structure,as Function of CEP.46 3.8.Missiles Required to Hit 150 x

31、 200 ft Structure,as Function of CEP.46 3.9.Aircraft Parking Ramps on Tainan Air Base.47 3.10.Weapons Required to Cover a Single 800 x 800 ft Ramp.49 3.11.Weapons Required to Cover a Single 700 x 1,250 ft Ramp.49 3.12.Weapons Required to Cover a Single 800 x 800 ft Ramp.50 4.1.Chinese FLANKER Fighte

32、r .55 4.2.Outcomes of All Cases.70 4.3.Effects of PLAAF Modernization.72 4.4.Effects of PLAAF Aircrew Quality.73 4.5.Effects of PRC Air Operations.74 4.6.Effects of Anti-PGM Defenses.75 4.7.Effects of ROCAF Modernization,with 60 Sorties a Day per Base.76 4.8.Effects of ROCAF Modernization,with 40 So

33、rties a Day per Base.77x A Question of Balance 4.9.Effects of ROCAF Modernization,with 20 Sorties a Day per Base.77 4.10.Effects of Blue Sortie Generation.78 4.11.ROC Surface-to-Air Missile Survivability.79 4.12.Effects of the Number of Shelters.81 4.13.Effects of U.S.Contributions:Carrier Strike Gr

34、oups Alone.82 4.14.Effects of U.S.Contributions:Carrier Strike Groups and F-15s,F/A-18s on Okinawa.82 4.15.Effects of U.S.Contributions:Carrier Strike Groups and F-22s,F/A-18s on Okinawa.83 4.16.U.S.Contributions:CSGs and Guam F-22s.84 4.A.Overall Results,No Attacks on Okinawa.87 4.B.Effects of Atta

35、cks on Kadena,F-22 Cases.88 5.1.HMS Antelope Explodes in San Carlos Water,May 24,1982.100 5.2.Hellfire II Missile and Launcher.114 A.1.TSMC Fab 12,Hsinchu Science Industrial Park,Taiwan.147 A.2.Single-Shot Hit Probability Against Rectangular Buildings.148 A.3.Number of Missiles Required to Achieve a

36、 90 Percent Probability of Hit Against Rectangular Buildings.148xiTables 3.1.Characteristics of CSS-7,CSS-6,and Notional SRBM.34 3.2.Characteristics of Notional Anti-Runway SRBM Warhead.40 3.3.Military Air Bases and Runways on Taiwan.42 4.1.Projected PLAAF Inventories.54 4.2.Projected ROCAF Inventor

37、ies.56 4.3.ROC SAM Effectiveness.61 4.4.Sortie Rates and Exchange Ratios.65 4.5.First-Day Sorties Flown.66 4.6.Example Air-to-Air Engagement Rates.66 4.7.Impacts of Scenario Variables on Outcomes.71 5.1.Argentine Fighter Aircraft:Numbers and Losses.98 5.2.British Ship Losses.98 5.3.Major PLAN Amphib

38、ious Vessels:2010.104xiiiSummaryThe military balance across the Taiwan Strait is changing in ways that make more complex both the set of operational challenges associated with defending Taiwan against a possible Chinese attack and the stra-tegic imperative of shaping Chinese behavior so that no such

39、 attack ever occurs.This report documents a follow-on effort to one published in 2000(Shlapak,Orletsky,and Wilson,2000),reassessing and expanding that earlier studys snapshot of the cross-strait balance,looking ahead to the 20102015 period.As in the 2000 study,we employed a mix of theater-level comb

40、at modeling,simpler mathematical models,historical analy-sis,interviews with experts,and qualitative judgment.The conclusions of the present work have proven to be substantially less optimistic for the Taiwan(and U.S.)side.The Evolving Cross-Strait DisputeMa Ying-jeous election in 2008 as Taiwans pr

41、esident and the further consolidation of the Kuomintangs(KMTs)hold on Taiwans national legislature(the Legislative Yuan,or LY)has led to a reassuring break from 12 years of cross-strait frictions,during the last eight of which(20002008)Beijing struggled to keep independence-minded Taiwan president C

42、hen Shui-bian“contained.”This period featured the use of economic harassment as a politically satisfyingthough not always successfulshort-term method of signaling Chinese displeasure.But Beijings difficulty translating economic leverage into political leverage xiv A Question of Balanceis not necessa

43、rily good news for either Taiwan or the United States.If China comes to believe that nonviolent tools have lost efficacy,it might be inclined to ratchet up military pressure in the event of a crisis,if only because of a perceived lack of effective alternatives.Among the more profound changes to affe

44、ct the political bal-ance between Beijing and Taipei has been the growth of a widespread independent Taiwan identity,a sense of distinct“Taiwanese-ness.”By December 2008,survey data indicated that the overwhelming major-ity of the islands citizens identified themselves as exclusively Taiwan-ese(51 p

45、ercent)or both Taiwanese and Chinese(41 percent).By far the most troubling statistic,from Beijings perspective,must be that fewer than 5 percent described themselves as exclusively Chinese.However,the rise of this Taiwanese identity has not yet produced a pro-independence majority on the island.Chen

46、s troubled administration,beset by slow economic growth and tormented by a fractious KMT majority in the LY,proved unable to build consensus in a number of areas,most prominently in defense policy and military procurement.Defense appropriations and pur-chases of important systems were frozen by the

47、partisan bickering that gripped Taiwans government.With a solidly entrenched KMT government,as of summer 2009,controlling both Taiwans executive and legislative branches,even the most paranoid of Chinese leaders must have some confidence that no one on Taiwan will be inclined to“push the envelope”on

48、 independence or related issues any time soon.However,it is in these very expecta-tions of a new and more accommodating Taiwan government that the seeds of disappointment and future crisis may lie.Although indepen-dence remains a distant dream for the relatively small proportion of Taiwans citizens

49、who support it,the changes in the political,social,and cultural identity of the islands population are genuine,significant,and enduring,and these realities strongly suggest that even the most flexible Taipei government will reach its limits of possible accommo-dation well short of Beijings desired p

50、osition.The unbridgeable dis-tance between these two positions is not likely to shrink in the coming decade;the opposite may indeed be the case,regardless of which party rules Taiwan.Summary xvFurther,Chinas growing military power may convince its leaders that the mainland possesses credible options