中国农村金融改革历程经验教训.PPT

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1、1中国农村金融改革历程经验教训 Still waters run deep.流静水深流静水深,人静心深人静心深 Where there is life,there is hope。有生命必有希望。有生命必有希望2农村金融的概念农村金融的概念什么是“三农”？农村农业农民什么是农村金融？贷款存款支付保险租赁贸易融资（trade credit)其他3农村金融的需求与供给农村金融的需求与供给需求的多样性农户q种植q养殖q副业q婚丧嫁娶q治病等农民工企业q微型q小型q中型村镇政府供给正规金融机构民间借贷4农村金融改革历程回顾农村金融改革历程回顾农业合作化运动中产生的农信社成立专业银行成立政策性银行对农村

2、金融市场实行保护和限制实行以低利率、高补贴的农村金融政策改革农信社1997年亚洲金融危机之后：恢复其合作制性质2003-2006：注资；明确所有者；移交省政府（成立省联社）2007年：新的一轮改革试点开始小额信贷试点（人民银行主导的）2006年12月以来：降低农村金融市场准入门槛（银监会主导的）村镇银行贷款公司村级农村金融互助组织农发行农业银行邮政储蓄银行5中国农村金融的现状中国农村金融的现状Current status of rural finance in China农业占GDP的比重在大幅度下降 Share of agricultural production in GDP has be

3、en on the decline对“三农”的关注表明从旧范式向新范式过渡 Concern over san nong indicates transition from the old to the new paradigm但是仍然在实行对农业信贷的补贴 However subsidized lending to agriculture continues农村存贷款利率逐步放宽但仍缺乏足够的灵活性 Rural interest rates have been deregulated to large extent but still insufficient仍然缺乏扶助性的农村金融监管制度

4、Absence of an enabling regulatory regime needed for sustainable rural-and micro-finance农村金融的基础设施仍然不健全 Continued lack of public infrastructure for rural finance6农村金融的特点：风险大成本高农村金融的特点：风险大成本高 Characteristics of rural finance风险大 High risks季节性波动 Seasonal fluctuations协方差风险 Covariance risks规模小并且市场分割 Small

5、size of production and fragmented markets缺乏传统的抵押物 Lack of traditional collateral保险和劳动力市场不配套 Poorly complementary insurance and labor markets基础设施不健全 Lack of physical and public infrastructure7农村金融的目标农村金融的目标减轻贫困？增加农民收入？保证农业稳定县域经济？保护农村信用社？防止财政风险？为农村的企业和农户提供金融服务？8教训之一：误把农村金融当作农业信贷教训之一：误把农村金融当作农业信贷Lesson

6、 one:RF mistaken as agricultural credit很多政府把为传统的初级农业提供信贷当作是农村金融 Many governments equated primary agricultural credit to rural finance因为初级农产品价格往往随着产量的增加而下降，因此农民的收入得不到提高 As prices of primary agricultural products tend to decline with growing supply,farmers income are often suppressed出于对食品安全和农民福利的考虑，政府

7、往往通过增加补贴的办法试图扩大农业信贷规模 Out of consideration for food safety and welfare of the farmers,governments have a tendency to increase agricultural credit through subsidies9教训之二：扭曲的资金价格导致资源错配教训之二：扭曲的资金价格导致资源错配Lesson two:distorted prices lead to misallocation这种范式的突出特点是实行低利率、补贴贷款和指令性信贷计划 An important feature o

8、f this paradigm is to impose regulated low interest rates and subsidized and directed lending由此使得那些能够产生较高回报的经济活动反而得不到融资,从而导致资源分配的扭曲 Those economic activities with high potential returns are crowded out,resulting in misallocation of resources实证研究表明政府在农村基础设施、教育、卫生领域的投资实际上更有效率 Empirical evidence is abu

9、ndant that investment in rural infrastructure,education and health generates tremendous higher returns than direct household subsidy10农业农业信信贷补贴贷补贴与与医疗及基础教育融资效益比较医疗及基础教育融资效益比较Comparing Agricultural Credit Subsides with Funding for Preventative Health and Basic Education11教训之三教训之三：补贴反而造成更大的不公平补贴反而造成更大

10、的不公平Lesson three:subsidy worsens social inequality补贴的本意是减轻贫困农民的负担 The motivation behind subsidy is to lessen the burden of poor farmers然而全世界普遍的现象是低利率贷款往往被那些有权有势的人获得 However it is universally true that subsidized loans are often grabbed by the rich and influential其结果反而使富者更富，从而加剧了社会的不公平 Consequently t

11、he rich becomes richer therefore making the social inequality even worse指令性贷款和补贴贷款治标不治本，无法从根本上解决金融市场效率低下的问题 Directed,subsidized credit was a poor response to the symptoms without addressing the root cause of poorly performing Rural Financial Markets(RFMs)12教训之四：低估农民创造价值的能力教训之四：低估农民创造价值的能力Lesson four

12、:underestimation of farmers ability很多人认为农民作为弱势群体没有能力承担较高利率 Many believe the farmers are unable to bear higher interest rates as they are the weak and vulnerable从而认为农村小额信贷必须实行低利率 Therefore believing that rural microfinance must be provided at low interest rate这种认识往往来源于错误地把社会平均利润率等同于边际投资回报率 Such erron

13、eous thinking often stems from mistaking average social returns as marginal investment returns13教训之五教训之五:旧的范式加剧农村金融机构的问题旧的范式加剧农村金融机构的问题Lesson five:the old paradigm weakens RFIs低利率和指令性信贷政策使得农村金融机构没有动力实行商业化经营 Regulated interest rates and directed lending take away incentives for RFIs to assume commerc

14、ial orientation因为按照低利率每发放一笔贷款都意味着产生新的亏损 As each new loan implies additional loss at the less than equilibrium interest rates只要有政府干预存在这些农村金融机构就有理由指望在发生亏损的时候政府会对其实行监管宽容或救助 As long as government intervention continues these RFIs have reason to expect regulatory forbearance or direct bailout 14 2%4%6%8%

15、10%12%14%16%18%20%22%24%26%28%30%Interest Rate Paid by RFI on its Borrowed Funds主要假设：股本占总资产的10%，年度平均总资产回报率是20%，管理费用占总资产的6%。Key Assumptions:equity equals 10 percent of total assets,the average annual yield obtained on total assets is 20 percent,and administrative expenses are six percent of total ass

16、ets./15教训之六教训之六:错把较高的市场利率视作高利贷错把较高的市场利率视作高利贷Lesson six:regarding high interest rates as usurious传统上有些国家把高于管制的利率视作高利贷 Traditionally some governments regard any interest rates above the regulated rates as usurious也有的国家法律设定一个标准，超过即视为高利贷 And still others have legislations providing for a threshold for u

17、surious interest rates然而那种按照一定绝对额设定高利贷界限的做法已经过时了 However it is outdated practice to pinpoint an absolute value as usurious interest rate实际上只要借款者能够在偿还贷款本息之后仍有利润空间利率就不是高利贷 As long as the borrower is able to generate profit after paying interest and principle the interest rate is not usurious16微型贷款为什么需

18、要高利率微型贷款为什么需要高利率Why lending rate for microloans needs to be high如果每笔贷款成本25元If actual cost per loan is$25占占1万元贷款平均成本万元贷款平均成本the percentage cost for a$10,000 loan0.25%25%占占100元贷款平均成本元贷款平均成本the percentage cost for a$100 loan 如果利率不变银行肯定如果利率不变银行肯定不愿意发放小额贷款不愿意发放小额贷款17教训之七教训之七:政府的预算是有限的因此补贴不是办法政府的预算是有限的因此补

19、贴不是办法Lesson seven:there is a limit to the state budget在任何情况下政府的预算都是有限的，因此政府面临两难选择 In any given situation the government capacity to provide subsidy is limited,therefore the government is confronted with a cruel dilemma也就是说到底是以较高的补贴但是却只能使较少的人受惠 Namely to provide relatively higher subsidy but only to

20、reach fewer rural households或者以较低甚至是零补贴但是却能使有限的资金惠及更多的目标人群 Or to reach more households with lower or even zero subsidy没有任何政府能够避开这种选择 No government can escape from this cruel dilemma18问题是政府面临残酷的两难选择问题是政府面临残酷的两难选择But there is a cruel dilemma在财政约束条件下每单位贷款 faced with budget constraints,for each unit len

21、t:或者以较少乃至零补贴使更多的目标人群得到实惠 either benefit more target group with less or zero subsidy或者以较多的补贴使较少的目标人群得到实惠or benefit less target group with more subsidy19Urban areas高收入客户高收入客户低收入客户低收入客户目前提供的目前提供的服务服务商业可持续商业可持续边界边界城市城市农村农村市场市场效率效率差距差距微型金融的商业可持续边界微型金融的商业可持续边界Frontier of commercial microfinance20教训之八：政府办农

22、村金融机构很少有成功的教训之八：政府办农村金融机构很少有成功的Lesson eight:governments are not good at running rural financial institutions从国际范围看只有少数国家的国有金融机构取得成功 Worldwide there are only a few countries that have successful state-owned financial institutions而这些国家往往有较为健全的市场经济和良好的法律环境 And those countries without exception have rel

23、atively advanced market economy and conducive legal environment若想成为成功的金融机构所有者除非政府模仿私人所有者把利润最大化作为首要目标 The government as owner can succeed only if it mimics private owners with profit maximization as the only objective但是常识告诉我们这对于政府是极为困难的 But common sense has it that it is almost next to impossible for

24、 government to do so21教训之九教训之九:过度的监管可能会扼杀农村金融过度的监管可能会扼杀农村金融Lesson nine:overly intrusive regulation could stifle RF很多国家是先有农村金融（小额信贷）后有监管 In many countries development of rural/micro finance leads regulation对于那些并不吸收公众存款的农村小额信贷没有必要对其实行审慎监管 It is not advisable to impose prudential regulation over RFIs t

25、hat do not take public deposits即使是这类农村小额信贷也需要以机构为基础才有可能持久发展 However such microfinance needs to be institution-based to be sustainable这样就需要有扶助性的农村金融监管框架 Thus there is strong need for enabling regulatory framework for rural finance22教训之十教训之十:不当的评价标准导致错误的战略与政策不当的评价标准导致错误的战略与政策 Lesson ten:inappropriate

26、performance criteria could lead to wrong strategies and policies多数农村金融机构被大量补贴,其“利润”通常是大量补贴后的剩余价值 Most rural DFIs are heavily subsidized.Their“profit”is usually a residual value of a substantial subsidy they consume.“投资回报”其实不是真正的回报 The“return”is no real return23中国从国际教训的可借鉴之处中国从国际教训的可借鉴之处What can Chin

27、a learn from those lessons增加农村收入和减少贫困的努力必须考虑整个农村产业，而不仅仅是农民 Rural income generation and poverty alleviation efforts must take into accounts the entire rural sector,not just farmers如果及时拨付贷款，信贷条件合理，小规模的农户能够、也愿意付适当高的利率 Small-scale farmers are able and willing to pay appropriately high interest rates if

28、loan disbursement is timely and credit conditions are appropriate 24政府的政府的作用作用 Role of Government 旧角色旧角色 OLD直接干预及管理农业信贷的数量与价格 To directly intervene and administer agricultural credit quantity and price 新角色新角色 NEW最大限度地减少直接干预和信贷控制,以创造一个良好的政策环境To create a favorable policy environment,while minimizing d

29、irect intervention 25政府的作用：农村金融机构政府的作用：农村金融机构农业银行农村信用社邮政储蓄银行农业发展银行村镇银行小额贷款公司村级合作金融组织26政府的作用政府的作用建立有担保的交易框架概念：什么可以作为抵押？法律：q保护债权人还是债务人？q如何确立优先规则？公示：登记还是备案？查询：时间、成本？执行：保护债权人还是保护债务人？27政府的作用：如何设计和发放补贴政府的作用：如何设计和发放补贴如何把有限的公共资源用到该用的地方补贴谁？怎样补贴？是否要评价效果？怎样评价？避免挤出民间投资者避免扭曲市场机制避免加剧赖帐文化28如何实现业绩的最优化如何实现业绩的最优化Opti

30、mizing performance in rural finance对目标客户群的金融服务对目标客户群的金融服务覆盖面大并且具有可持续性覆盖面大并且具有可持续性Sustainable financial services that reach the target clients对目标客户群的金融服务对目标客户群的金融服务覆盖面大但是补贴程度也高覆盖面大但是补贴程度也高Highly subsidized financial services that reach the target Clients对目标客户群的金融服务对目标客户群的金融服务覆盖面小并且补贴程度高覆盖面小并且补贴程度高Hig

31、hly subsidized financial services with low outreach to target clients对目标客户群的金融服务对目标客户群的金融服务覆盖面较小但是有可持续性覆盖面较小但是有可持续性Sustainable financial services with low outreach to the target clients 覆覆盖盖面面大大覆覆盖盖面面小小自我持续性强自我持续性强 High Self-Sustainability自我持续性低自我持续性低 Low Self-SustainibilitySource:Adapted from Majah

32、an,1994.29农村金融机构业绩的评价标准 Criteria For Assessing-The Performance of RFIs主要主要评评价标准价标准 自我持自我持续续性性目标客户覆盖面目标客户覆盖面成份指数成份指数:补贴补贴指数指数将补贴与将补贴与利息收入比较利息收入比较混合指数混合指数:评评价覆盖面与服价覆盖面与服务质务质量量补贴补贴举例举例:国家承担国家承担贷贷款款损损失失优惠优惠贷款的利率补贴贷款的利率补贴资本金的机会成本资本金的机会成本准准备金豁免备金豁免 举举例例:市市场场占有率占有率相相对对收入水平、服收入水平、服务质务质量量存款存款额额贷贷款款额额30补贴补贴依依

33、赖赖指数指数作为一种分析框架作为一种分析框架 Subsidy Dependence Index as a framework补贴依赖指数提供了衡量农村金融机构绩效的方法 The SDI provides a methodology to measure the true performance of RFIs同时也提供了一种分析框架 Meanwhile it is also an analytical framework 可以为农村金融改革和发展提供一种新的视角 provding a new perspective in approaching rural finance reform and

34、 development31补贴补贴依依赖赖指数指数 Subsidy Dependence Index(SDI)The SDI measures the percentage increase in the RFI average on-lending interest rate required to compensate for eliminating all subsidies received by the RFI 补贴依赖指数衡量的是，假如取消对农村金融机构补贴，其平均贷款利率增长的百分比 SDI=S/(LP x I)；SDI=RFIs subsidy dependence inde

35、x（农村金融机构的补贴依赖指数）LP=Avg.annual outstanding loan portfolio of the RFI （农村金融机构年度平均贷款余额）I=Avg.on lending interest rate of the RFI （农村金融机构平均贷款利率）32补贴补贴依依赖赖指数指数 （续）续）Subsidy Dependence Index(SDI)(contd)S=补贴总额；S=Total subsidies;市场资金成本与会计成本之差乘以年均借款额 Difference between market and accounting cost of funds mul

36、tiplied by annual average borrowed funds;股本的机会成本及 Opportunity cost of equity and;所有其它补贴 All other subsidies33我们从本部分学到了什么？我们从本部分学到了什么？What have we learned from this session?实现商业可持续性是扩大农村金融覆盖面和减少补贴依赖的根本途径 Commercial sustainability is the way to expanded outreach and reduced dependency dependency扶助性的农村金融监管框架有助于实现上述目标 An enabling regulatory framework helps achieving the goal of commercialization of rural finance决策者和监管者改变观念是成功的第一步 Change in mindset is the first necessary step