高盛2020年全球经济展望.docx

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1、20 November 2019 | 11:02AM ESTGlobal Economics AnalystA Break in the CloudsWe expect the global growth slowdown that began in early 2018 to end soon, in response to easier financial conditions and an end to the trade escalation. Although annual-average GDP growth is likely to rise only modestly from

2、 3.1% in 2019 to 3.4% in 2020, this conceals a more pronounced sequential pattern of slowing growth this year andin our forecastgradually rising growth next year. The risk of a global recession remains more limited than suggested by the flat yield curve, which partly reflects a structural decline in

3、 the term premium, and the low unemployment rate, whose predictive value for inflation and aggressive monetary tightening has fallen. We also take comfort from the absence of significant private sector financial deficits in all but a few advanced economies. Our confidence that growth will improve se

4、quentially is highest in the US, where demand is most responsive to financial conditions, and the UK, where we expect the Brexit drag to reverse and fiscal policy to ease. We look for a more gradual pickup in Europe, where the fiscal boost is likely to remain (too) limited, and Japan, where we are w

5、atching carefully for a negative impact from the October consumption tax hike. We expect growth in China to slow modestly from just above 6% to just below, in line with gradually decelerating potential. Across many advanced economies, we expect continued labor market improvement and upward pressure

6、on wage growth, which is likely to push unit labor costs above central bank inflation targets. However, the pass-through to core price inflation should remain limited because the price Phillips curve is much flatter than the wage Phillips curve given stable inflation expectations. In our baseline fo

7、recast, most DM central banks stay on hold in 2020. At least in the early part of the year, however, the risk is on the side of further easing, especially in the Euro area and Japan where growth is weak and inflation far below target. We also expect further cuts in a number of EMs and smaller DMs. S

8、lightly better growth, limited recession risk, and friendly monetary policy should provide a decent background for financial markets in the early part of 2020. However, concerns about the impact of higher corporate taxes on profits could rise in the runup to the US presidential election. Even aside

9、from politics, rising wage growth looks set to reduce profit margins over the next several years.Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC certification and other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to .Partly

10、driven by the better trade news and partly by the earlier monetary policy easing, the other shock of the past yearthe sharp tightening in financial conditions in late 2018has now fully reversed. Our US FCI has moved back to the level seen in mid-2018 and our global FCI now stands near the lowest lev

11、el since before the financial crisis. Easier financial conditions are likely to boost growth, especially in economies such as the United States where the empirical linkage between the FCI and growth is particularly close. Exhibit 10 shows that the US growth impulse from financial conditions is likel

12、y to move up from about -%pp at the start of 2019 to +%pp in early 2020 in the US (assuming markets stay around current levels).Index100.6Index100.6Percentage pointsPercentage pointsExhibit 10: The FCI Growth Impulse Is Turning PositiveGS FCI100.4100.2100.099.899.699.499.499.299.299.0USGlobalJun Aug

13、 Oct Dec Feb Apr Jun Aug Oct20182019100.499.699.0Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchThis easing in financial conditions suggests not only that global growth is likely to pick up somewhat in absolute terms, but also that growth may come in stronger than currently predicted by the forecas

14、ter community. Exhibit 11 shows that large moves in financial conditions have statistically significant predictive value for subsequent surprises in growth relative to consensus expectations.5See David Choi, “Do Forecasters Fully Account for Financial Conditions?” US Daily, November 12, 2019.In othe

15、r words, financial conditions not only affect the growth outlook, but they affect it by more than the median forecaster seems to assume.Exhibit 11: FCI Easing Predicts Upside Growth SurprisesChange in Financial Conditions Over Previous Quarter vs. Growth Forecast ErrorsGrowth Over Next QuarterGrowth

16、 Over Next Four Quarters8 -i8(dd) JseoaloL snsu suo。0pz-e a(dd) JseoaloL snsu suo。0pz-e ay = -0.83x +0.00t-stat = -2.302.253.00y = -0.35x - 0.17 t-stat = -2.312.253.00(dd) - SEOaloL snsu SUOO snuG MO-0pZ=E工1% sequential pace to the 2%-2% range in 2020.Exhibit 12: A Strong Structural Outlook for US H

17、ousingSource: Census Bureau, Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchThe starting point in Europe is considerably worse than in the US, as the average growth pace has slowed to a clearly below-trend pace and large economies such as Germany, Italy, and the UK are contracting (at least according to ou

18、r CAI). Incrementally, however, the news has also turned more positive. The most important is early signs of stabilization in the manufacturing sector, which is twice as large relative to GDP in Germany as in the US. In addition, we also expect a moderate fiscal boost of about 0.3pp in the Euro area

19、, mostly because Germany isbelatedly and incrementally- moving toward a more expansionary setting. All told, we expect the sequential annualized pace of Euro area growth to move up from the current 0.2% (based on our CAI) to just over 1% in 2020only a little above trend but probably enough to keep t

20、he labor market recovery going in most countries. We see a more substantial pickup from slightly negative numbers now to a 2.4% sequential pace in 2020 H2 in the UK, which should benefit from a resolution of the Brexit uncertainty as well as a sizable fiscal boost after the December 12 election.See

21、Adrian Paul, Z/UKA Post-Election Pickup/ European Daily, November 13, 2019.Exhibit 13: A Stronger Fiscal Tailwind in the UK than in the Euro AreaPercentage pointsPercentage pointsPercentage pointsPercentage pointsSource: Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchIn contrast to the US and Europe, China

22、 is unlikely to see a meaningful sequential acceleration. This year, policymakers managed to prevent a sharp slowdown in growth by allowing the currency to depreciate and easing macro policy across a number of different levers summarized in our domestic macro policy proxy. That said, policymakers ha

23、ve taken a more conservative approach to policy stimulus than in the past. Next year we expect them to allow actual growth to slow in line with potential from just above 6% to just below, while aiming to boost the “quality of growth by keeping a lid on property speculation and limiting the overall p

24、ickup in leverage. Barring further trade escalation, the spillovers from China to the rest of the region should be less adverse in 2020 than in 2019 with a likely recovery in China imports and no significant currency depreciation. Elsewhere in Asia, the news is more mixed, with a likely pickup in In

25、dia on the back of the corporate tax cut and easier monetary policy but risk of a slowdown in Japan following the consumption tax increase in October.Exhibit 14: Slower Growth and More Limited Debt GrowthSource: Wind, Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchThe slowdown in global growth has done onl

26、y limited damage to the labor market so far. Despite weaker job gains, the unemployment rate is still trending sideways to lower in most advanced economies, as shown in Exhibit 15. Any pickup in global growth should enable labor markets to make renewed progress in the next year.Exhibit 15: The G7 Un

27、employment Rate Is Still Trending LowerSource: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchIn many advanced economiesincluding all of the G7 except France and Italythis is likely to mean continued multi-decade lows in the unemployment rate and other measures of labor market slack. And lower u

28、nemployment is likely to result in continued, if gradual, upward pressure on wage growth. As shown in Exhibit 16, any further acceleration is likely to take wage growth in many advanced economies beyondthe sustainable pace, defined as the sum of the central banks inflation target and the long-term t

29、rend rate of productivity growth.Exhibit 16: Wage Growth Is Picking UpSource: Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchAll else equal, excess unit labor cost growth is likely to imply upward pressure on core inflation, as firms try to defend their profit margins. However, it is important to remember

30、that the price Phillips curve is only about one-quarter as steep as the wage Phillips curve. This means that only one-quarter of any unemployment-driven pickup in wage and unit labor cost growth typically shows up in higher price inflation. Indeed, we expect only a modest pickup in core inflation ra

31、tes across most of the advanced economies to rates generally no greater than central bank inflation targets, as shown in Exhibit 17.Exhibit 17: We Expect Core Inflation to Remain Below Target in Most DMsSource: Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchCentral Banks Move to the Sideli

32、nesMonetary policy has taken a much more dovish turn than we expected over the past year, with Fed officials moving from rate increases throughout 2018 to 75bp of cuts over the past three months. Other central banks followed suit, especially across the emerging world. Exhibit 18 shows that this was

33、the sharpest turn for global central banks since the global financial crisis.Exhibit 18: A Sharp Turn for Global Central BanksSource: Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchBut the adjustment should now be mostly behind us. Under our economic forecast of slightly above-trend growth and 2% inflation

34、, the Fed should be on hold throughout2020. One reason why the risk to our call is still slightly on the downside is that we expect the Fed to tweak its policy framework in the direction of average inflation targeting, which would call for inflation slightly above 2% at this stage of the business cy

35、cle. But Fed officials would probably not implement this new regime mechanically, so inflation at 2% would not be a sufficient reason to cut further barring a renewed bout of weakness in economic activity or a sizable tightening in financial conditions.In other advanced economies, it is a closer cal

36、l. Given limited room for further easing, slightly better growth numbers and receding downside risks, we have removed the remaining lObp cut in the ECB deposit rate from our forecast. However, given weak actual and expected inflation, it is possible that the debate could shift back to rate cuts and,

37、 in any case, we expect the ECB to maintain its EUR20bn/month QE program until end-2021. We also think additional rate cuts in Japan, Canada and if Brexit takes an unexpected turn for the worsethe UK are possible, though none are our base case.In parts of the emerging world, near-term rate cuts rema

38、in likely. In particular, we see further sizable moves in Turkey, Russia, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, and Egypt on the back of below-potential growth and/or subdued inflation.Profit Margins Under PressureThe single biggest event of 2020 is likely to be the US election on November 3. Prediction mar

39、kets currently imply a 36% probability of a Democratic majority in the Senate. In light of the fact that outcomes of competitive Senate seats and presidential elections are correlated, this is probably also close to the implied probability of unified Democratic control.All four of the Democratic fro

40、ntrunners in the prediction marketsSenator Warren, former Vice President Biden, Mayor Buttigieg, and Senator Sanders have proposed at least a partial repeal of the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA), which cut the federal statutory corporate income tax rate from 35% to 21%. And if Democrats gain even

41、a small majority in the Senate, we would expect an increase in the corporate tax rate.Our portfolio strategists have estimated that full repeal would reduce S&P 500 earnings in 2021 by 11%.If Democrats fail to gain unified control, US tax policy would likely remain unchanged at least until 2023. But

42、 even in this case, the fundamentals for corporate profits not only in the US but across many advanced economiesare likely to deteriorate. With unit labor costs growing faster than prices in most major economies, the share of national income going to labor is rising, as shown in Exhibit 19. A higher

43、 labor share is likely to come at the expense of profits, and this is one reason why our portfolio strategists expect fairly muted profit growth in most advanced economies in 2020.G3 Labor Share57.056.556.055.555.054.554.0Percent57.5 -i1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

44、Exhibit 19: The Labor Share Is Picking UpPercentr 57.5 l 54.0Source: Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchFrom a markets perspective, our 2020 outlook is therefore more mixed than our relatively sanguine view on both recession risk and central bank policy might suggest. After a l

45、ong period in which profits and financial assets outperformed wages and the real economy, the next several years will likely see the reverse. There is a limit to this process. If the labor market tightens excessively, the downward pressure on margins might get so intense that companies react by eith

46、er pushing up prices sharply (and thereby prompting central banks to hike rates aggressively) or cutting investment and hiring by enough to undercut aggregate demand (and thereby causing a recession). But in 2020, we still expect the swing in the pendulum to remain quite gradual and the global econo

47、my to clock yet another year of progress.Jan HatziusDaan StruyvenRonnie WalkerGS MACRO OUTLOOK 2020Explore Disclosure AppendixReg ACWe, Jan Hatzius, Daan Struyven and Ronnie Walker, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect our personal views, which have not be

48、en influenced by considerations of the firms business or client relationships.Unless otherwise stated, the individuals listed on the cover page of this report are analysts in Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research division.DisclosuresRegulatory disclosuresDisclosures required by United States laws

49、 and regulationsSee company-specific regulatory disclosures above for any of the following disclosures required as to companies referred to in this report: manager or co-manager in a pending transaction; 1% or other ownership; compensation for certain services; types of client relationships; managed/co-managed public offerings in prior